Child abuse and neglect can harm young people in ways beyond the immediate pain and suffering inflicted. Many studies point to long-term consequences, finding that victims of child abuse and neglect are at greater risk of delinquency, substance abuse, adult criminality, and other problems than individuals who have not been
Westat as the national evaluator, and a technical assistance team including individuals from the National Civic League and the Institute for Educational Leadership-supported the initiative. 3 The technical assistance team was added in the second year to promote a stronger focus on systems reform and to help sites access a wider range of technical assistance, which included onsite assistance and subsidies for training or consultation provided by other sources. DOJ also convened meetings twice a year for national team members and the sites to create a shared vision for SK/SS and to introduce best practices from other jurisdictions.
Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program
The goals of SK/SS were ambitious. The program was designed to help communities make significant changes in the policies, procedures, and practices of agencies that deal with children who are experiencing-or are at risk of experiencing-abuse and neglect and their families. DOJ expected communities to become more comprehensive and proactive in their efforts to combat child abuse and neglect, improve coordination and collaboration across agencies, and deploy resources more effectively. To engage the community, sites were expected to The program's goals were ambitious, requiring communities to change their practices in dealing with abused and neglected children. The program provided fiscal and technical support to five sites to strengthen and improve information sharing among their juvenile justice, criminal justice, and child welfare systems. Although sites were allowed considerable flexibility in program design, they had to include four key components: systems reform and accountability, an enhanced continuum of services, improved data collection and evaluation, and prevention education.
Safe Kids/Safe Streets represents a comprehensive application of collaborative approaches in the child maltreatment field. The experiences of participating sites included in this Bulletin offer considerable insights into collaboration building, systems reform, service options, and other strategies. As a partnering agency, OJJDP believes that these experiences will help other jurisdictions develop, sustain, and enhance collaborative efforts that will reduce child abuse and neglect and their aftereffects.
Source for This Bulletin
The information in this Bulletin is adapted from the four-volume evaluation report National Evaluation of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program: Final Report (Gragg et al., 2004) , available at www.ncjrs.gov. The report describes the results of Westat's national evaluation of the program's planning and implementation from 1997, when sites were first funded, through June 2003. Findings are based on multiple sources of information, including semiannual site visits, review of project documentation, three stakeholder surveys, a survey of agency personnel, and two structured surveys of key informants (e.g., individuals who played key roles in the child abuse and neglect system or who routinely observed the system's operations). The report also includes a logic model and a detailed case study of the SK/SS experience for each site.
develop broad-based local collaboratives, building on relationships and collabora tions already in place. The SK/SS collabo ratives were to include justice, child wel fare, family service, education, health, and mental health agencies and also nontradi tional partners such as faith-based organi zations, community groups, the media, and victims and their families.
Each site also had to develop and imple ment plans covering four components (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquen cy Prevention, 1996) : ❒ Systems reform and accountabilityreforming agency policies, practices, and procedures and improving crossagency training and communication. ❒ An enhanced continuum of services, from prevention to treatmentimproving existing services, filling gaps, and using current resources more effec tively, including those of public, pri vate, and informal support systems. ❒ Data collection and evaluationimproving local data collection and information sharing across systems and agencies to support decisionmak ing in individual cases and to help the community evaluate progress toward its objectives. ❒ Prevention education-educating the community about child abuse and ne glect and how to report it, community services, good parenting practices, and the Safe Kids effort.
DOJ allowed sites considerable flexibility in program design but intervened if a site appeared to deviate significantly from the federal vision. Federal staff provided input on planning and, over time, clarified their expectations with support from the techni cal assistance team. This clarification emphasized the overarching importance of systems reform and the ways that the other program components could support it.
During the implementation phase, each site carried out a unique mix of activities. Some commonalities, however, were evi dent. For example, all sites worked to make more effective use of multidiscipli nary teams in cases of child abuse and neglect. All invested in children's advoca cy centers (CACs), which provide multi disciplinary handling of child abuse cases in a child-friendly setting. The five com munities also worked to improve training for mandated reporters (personnel in various agencies such as education and health who are required by state law to report suspected child abuse and ne glect). New services were implemented in each site, often through subgrants from the lead agency.
By mid-2003, when most data collection for the national evaluation ended, federal support was winding down in three sites-Burlington, Huntsville, and Toledo. However, they were expecting a final award to support the transition from fed eral to non-federal funding. Because their rate of spending was slower, Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie still had a year or more of federal funding left. 4 Four of the five SK/SS collaboratives were hoping to survive beyond the term of federal fund ing. Kansas City was the exception; its collaborative planned to transfer its func tions to another multiagency committee with ongoing responsibility for child pro tective services.
The SK/SS communities made impressive progress both in establishing effective collaboratives and in implementing plans to improve local systems and services. Several sites showed promising signs that they would continue new services designed to fill gaps in the continuum of services (e.g., home visitation, therapy for child victims and witnesses of vio lence, joint programs involving both domestic violence advocates and police, neighborhood-based programs).
In addition to improving services, all sites made significant organizational changes, improving multidisciplinary teaming through CACs; setting up specialized law enforcement, prosecution, or court units; and adopting new protocols and proce dures. Many local stakeholders reported improvements in the following areas:
❒ Providing multiagency responses to child victims affected by domestic vio lence (67 percent). ❒ Educating the community about child abuse and neglect (61 percent). ❒ Improving services for children and families at risk of falling through the cracks (56 percent). ❒ Decreasing community tolerance for child maltreatment (54 percent). ❒ Leveraging resources across public and private agencies to support chil dren and families (50 percent).
Evaluators did not expect to find signifi cant reductions in child maltreatment during the evaluation period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . In fact, it seemed likely that SK/SS would actually spur an increase in reported cases of child abuse and neglect-particularly if the projects raised awareness of child abuse, educated people about how to re port it, and increased confidence in child protective service agencies. Such increases in reporting could easily mask any reduc tions in abuse brought about by other project efforts. Indeed, an examination of trends in child abuse reports, substantia tions, and placements at these sites from 1997 to 2002 did not reveal clear, consis tent patterns that could be attributed to SK/SS.
A supplemental study conducted in three of the five SK/SS sites (Burlington, Hunts ville, and Kansas City) closely examined a sample of child maltreatment cases approximately 5 years after SK/SS started.
Researchers compared these data with findings from studies of earlier or baseline cases conducted by local SK/SS evalua tors. 5 It was difficult to draw conclusions from the Huntsville and Kansas City data because of variations in methodology between the baseline and later studies. In Burlington, however, results were note worthy. Far fewer children were removed from their homes and many more of the families who needed home visiting services or substance abuse assessments received them. There were also indications that fam ilies were getting services earlier in the court process and reaching permanency more rapidly. In all three sites, the majority of children had achieved permanencyeither at home with their parents or in another placement-2 years after the tar get report or petition (Gragg, Cronin, and Schultz, 2005) . Planning and carrying out a systems reform effort takes a long time, even if the community has the infrastructure. All the SK/SS sites were intensively in volved in planning for at least 18 months, although partial implementation began within a year. DOJ extended the planning phase beyond 6 months and the overall initiative beyond the 5 1 / 2 years originally envisioned. DOJ also released implemen tation funds incrementally during plan ning to address pressing community con cerns and to ease the lengthy planning process. Following are planning recommendations based on the SK/SS experience: ❒ Assume that it will take 9 to 12 months for project planning and ini tial collaboration building. Collabora tive initiatives should begin with realis tic expectations about how long it will take to plan and organize, so that stakeholders do not become unduly discouraged or impatient. ❒ Develop detailed timelines for accom plishing key activities and achieving specified outcomes. Stakeholders should reach a consensus about the timeline, which should include recog nizable milestones. Rather than being a straitjacket that prevents the pro gram from responding to unexpected opportunities, the timeline should help the community make realistic plans, assess progress, and make necessary adjustments. ❒ Assume that the overall initiative will take 8 to 10 years. Communities and funders (both internal and external to the community) should be prepared for the long term. It may make sense to develop staged objectives: short, inter mediate, and long term. The pace of progress will vary depending on a num ber of local factors-readiness to take on systems reform, the initial status of collaboration, the strategies selected, barriers encountered, and the targeted outcomes. Funders, if involved, might emulate DOJ's decision to provide stepped-down transitional funding toward the end of the initiative. 2 DOJ expected funding for the first grant period to cover 18 months. Subsequent awards were for 1 year, but DOJ allowed projects to carry over unexpended funds. agenda. Most of the sites also held com munitywide meetings to publicize project activities and encourage input. The col laboratives engaged a broad spectrum of stakeholders, exceeding DOJ's core mem bership requirements. Further, the mem bers shared responsibility, accountability, and, to a lesser extent, resources.
Lessons From the SK/SS Experience

Collaborative Efforts
The 2003 stakeholder survey (n=277) 6 provides a glimpse of who these collabor ators were toward the end of the project, the extent of their participation, and their level of commitment. This survey targeted participants in governing councils, task forces, committees, and subgrants.
Figure 1 (page 5) shows stakeholder affili ation by category: the formal child protec tion system (including child protective services, law enforcement, prosecution, and dependency court), other public agencies, private agencies (mainly service providers), and private "nontraditional" groups (e.g., community or neighborhood organizations; professional, civic, or reli gious organizations; parents; youth; busi nesses). Overall, 57 percent of responding stakeholders represented the formal child protection system and other public agencies-25 percent from formal child protection agencies and 32 percent from other public agencies. However, the varia tion in affiliations across sites is marked. Public agency representation ranges from a low of 40 percent in Burlington to a high of 96 percent in Sault Ste. Marie. Toledo is the only place where respondents from the formal child protection system made up the majority (55 percent). Huntsville and Kansas City had the largest concen trations of nontraditional stakeholders, accounting for about 30 percent of all respondents at those sites.
The stakeholders reported significant commitments to SK/SS. The typical respondent reported spending about 2 hours per month on the program and attending five meetings per year. 7 How ever, each site had a core of much more active stakeholders. Overall, about one in five respondents spent 6 or more hours per month on SK/SS, and one in four attended at least one meeting per month. Other indications of stakeholder commitment include the following: ❒ In the past year, more than half the respondents (52 percent) reported attending community meetings con vened by the project, and approxi mately one-third helped implement project-funded activities. ❒ Smaller proportions of respondents helped train (17 percent), write pro ject plans or other documents (13 percent), and decide which groups should receive funding (7 percent). Toledo respondents were about three times as likely as other respondents to have been involved in writing plans or other documents. ❒ Although a modest correlation existed between receiving SK/SS funding and levels of participation in the collabora tive, many of the respondents whose organizations had never received SK/SS funding were involved several hours per month, and 38 percent reported that their organizations had con tributed staff to SK/SS efforts.
The responses to the stakeholder survey also suggest that many stakeholders felt a sense of responsibility to participate. When asked whether they personally had contributed sufficient time to SK/SS in the past year, 34 percent reported that they had not and 20 percent said that their organization had not. Only 9 percent of stakeholders said that they had con tributed more than enough time.
Many strategies that have been effec tive for other collaborative efforts also worked for SK/SS. Observers of other collaboratives have identified many strate gies that help build and maintain effective collaborations (CSR, Incorporated, 1996; Farrow, 1997; Melaville and Blank, 1991; Mizrahi, 1999; Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 2001 ). Many of these same approaches, highlighted below, were applied success fully at the SK/SS sites: 
Systems Reform
The SK/SS sites affected the child protec tion system in numerous ways. Collaboration can become the normal way of doing business. By 2002, evalua tors routinely heard from key informants, stakeholders, and agency frontline staff that collaboration had become the ex pected way of operating in the communi ty. This expectation cut across a wide range of activities, from working on indi vidual cases to delivering training to developing new grants. Many respondents pointed out that it would be hard to reverse the process.
Enhancing the Continuum of Services
Most SK/SS sites successfully filled service gaps and made services more accessible, at least during the term of federal fund ing. Except in Kansas City (where systems reform was the primary emphasis from the beginning), services were their high est priority during the early phases of implementation. The services funded ran the gamut from prevention to treat ment. In the service area, several sites expanded or improved home visitation, neighborhood-or community-based serv ices, and parent education. Initiatives to help children affected by domestic vio lence were also common. Some sites emphasized coordinated and wraparound services. At times, however, service initia tives threatened to overwhelm the rest of the agenda, and DOJ had to be vigilant in emphasizing systems reform. Other com prehensive initiatives have experienced a similar tug of war for resources between systems reform and direct services (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 1999).
One measure of DOJ's success in reinforc ing the primacy of systems reform can be seen in the allocation of funds and the shift in site priorities over time-reflecting local judgments about need as well as input from DOJ and the technical assistance team. Figure 2 (page 8) compares how each site allocated its SK/SS budget for two grant periods, grant 2 (early implementation) and grant 5 (late implementation). 8
Expenditures were distributed across several categories, three of which will be discussed here: core staff and administra tion, systems reform, and continuum of services. 9 The staffing category included the project director, other staff or consult ants who primarily engaged in manage Note: Investments in the data collection and prevention education components remained small, representing 6 percent or less of the budget in both grant periods. Those investments are excluded from this analysis, consequently percentages may not add to 100. ment or administrative support, and items such as rent, staff development, office expenses, and subgrants. 
Data Collection and Evaluation
With limited local capacity and interest, most sites made data collection and local evaluation a low priority. Significant barri ers to improving electronic case tracking and information sharing across agencies also were present-in the form of technol ogy, cost, organizational structure, and confidentiality concerns. Nonetheless, local capacity to collect and use data did increase, and there was greater recogni tion of the need for data to inform deci sions and track progress. In part, this was a response to the challenge of sustainabili ty, as sites became more aware that they would need to document their achieve ments and challenges for new sponsors.
Although no site implemented a compre hensive interagency management informa tion system (MIS), Toledo was in the early stages of two such efforts-one to track victims seen in the emergency room and the other for home visitation clients-and Kansas City and Huntsville were taking a second look at the possibilities. SK/SS sites received technical assistance in the latter areas, initially too early to be effective and later too late to affect their agendas significantly. Timely assistance is essential to helping a jurisdiction do a bet ter job of planning its agenda and allocat ing sufficient resources to data collection and integration efforts.
Prevention Education
At most SK/SS sites, modest prevention education efforts matured into more com prehensive strategies as the programs developed, though funding allocations typically remained small. The overarching lesson is to link prevention education efforts to the overall objectives of the initiative. 
❒
Summary
While collaborative approaches have been used successfully in other arenas, the SK/SS initiative represents the most com prehensive application in the child mal treatment field. It succeeded in building broad-based collaboratives focusing on child abuse and neglect issues in five very different communities. The five collabora tives enabled their communities to forge stronger interagency relationships and to focus on systems reform issues. They also engaged a broad range of stakeholders in developing and implementing a complex and ambitious agenda and made collabo ration a normal way of doing business.
Other communities can learn many valu able lessons from the experiences of these sites. 
